Original Analysis

The events of September 11 look less like an intelligence failure than a law enforcement fiasco, according to various comments in US newspapers. However, is it perhaps also an international intelligence liaison failure?

What has struck me as a close follower of the US-European intelligence relationship since 1945 that the whole aspect of intelligence liaison is still a very, very troubled one. There is absolutely no automatic exchange of intelligence. All governments are inherently reluctant to share even military intelligence, especially within multilateral bodies such as NATO. The American, French, British, German, Danish and Dutch intelligence services are among those that provide reports to NATO, but they are doctored so that references to sources or sensitive pieces of information are removed. There are simply too powerful restraints on collaboration. Risks to sources and methods, penetration, careless handling or public leaking of the shared intelligence or its deliberate use of it in trading with its other intelligence contacts.

As Michael Herman points out in his Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, 1996) there are various reason for states to cooperate. However, one basic reason for cooperation is that there is always more information potentially available than any agency can collect by itself. Perhaps this also holds true for the latest terrorist attacks. For example, according to a senior American official quoted in the New York Times the German intercepts of jubilant followers of Osama bin Laden remains a key clue. There is more evidence that European services are now providing the US intelligence community with 'pieces of the puzzles' which was not earlier available. Why so late?

Again, the US-European intelligence relationship has a long but often troubled history. Charles Grant wrote recently in his paper 'Intimate Relations' (London, 2001) that America's allies have long complained that it is particularly mean with its intelligence. For example it refused, until quite recently, to let NATO allies see imagery from satellite photos. The US intelligence community has also been 'mean' with sharing intercepts with the European allies as Matthew Aid and I showed in our recent Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War (London, 2001).

A recent Startfor analysis correctly observed that European officials have delivered with increasing frequency the message that intelligence sharing is a two-way street. It is a message, they could have added, which has been delivered also already many times in the past. European services are and were keenly aware of Washington's intelligence shortcomings. True, America's intelligence capabilities are significantly greater than the combined European capabilities. The EU therefore has a strong interest in getting access to as much US intelligence as possible. For example, autonomous EU military missions could be hampered by a lack of access to US raw intelligence and assessments as repeatedly happened on the Balkans since 1991. Nevertheless, is it not in Washington's interest to see Europe to evolve in directions that oppose US interests. The sharing of intelligence would, other things being equal encourage US and EU policies to converge rather than diverge. The US should therefore share as much as it can without endangering its national security.

And Europe has much to offer. Some even claim that more than 60% of the CIA's product at the height of the Cold War originated with cooperating services. One Anglo-American intelligence officer recently told to me: "Both CIA (in particular) and MI6 benefited far more than they would ever care to admit from the information they received from the smaller services, who eager for 'scrapes for the bountiful table' of the offensive services, especially CIA, were all too eager to bring any 'fruit' that they had to the big boys". But times are changing and must change.

It will not be an easy task. As the recent Startfor analysis formulated it: both the European Union and the United States will seek control over operations and intelligence, but both sides will be reluctant to fully disclose their own information and capabilities. Without the ability to control the use of sensitive intelligence, such as how and when operations will be launched, various smaller and bigger European countries will remain to be reluctant to share their most important intelligence.

According to an article in the Washington Post last Tuesday the US government spends nearly $ 800 million a year trying to predict and prepare for terrorist attacks and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence believes that major changes are necessary for the US $ 30 billion intelligence community. Well, perhaps a cheaper solution is available. Let us start of with improving the US-European intelligence liaison. It could perhaps be an important impetus for combating terrorism.

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